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In this paper we answer the question what implicit proof assertions
in the provability logic GL can be realized by explicit proof terms. In
particular we show that the fragment of GL which can be realized by
generalized proof terms of GLA is exactly S4∩GL and equals the fragment
that can be realized by proof-terms of LP. Additionally we show that the
problem of determining which implicit provability assertions in a given
modal formula can be made explicit is decidable. In the final sections
of this paper we establish the disjunction property for GLA and give an
axiomatization for GL ∩ S4.
1 Introduction
One of the most striking applications of classical propositional modal logic to
mathematics is without much doubt the interpretation of  as ‘provable in
Peano Arithmetic PA’. As a most simple and clear example of a modal formula
with an intuitively clear ‘provable in PA’ interpretation we have for example the
normality axiom:
(A → B) → (A → B) . (1)
Which expresses the rule of modus ponens. The project of studying meta-
mathematics using modal logic, originally suggested by Gödel, really came to
flourish after the arithmetical completeness theorem of Solovay [Sol76]. This
theorem identifies the logic GL as the logic of provability, see also [Boo93]. GL
is a remarkable system of modal logic that not only expresses Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem but even satisfies a fixed-point theorem, very much in
the spirit of Gödel’s fixed-point lemma but in a purely propositional setting.
Originally Gödel suggested the modal logic S4 as the logic of provability. This
is indeed a most natural candidate for a provability logic but as it turns out
incompatible with GL (the least normal modal logic extending both is the in-
consistent one)
Roughly the reason why S4 doesn’t work as a logic of provability in the
sense of Solovay’s theorems is that when reading the  as formal provability
the proofs don’t need to be real proofs, just objects that behave like proofs.
Just like infinite numbers in a non-standard model of Peano Arithmetic are not
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real numbers but mere objects that satisfy the familiar properties of numbers.
Artemov’s Logic of Proofs LP was invented to tackle this problem [AS92, Art95].
In LP the ’s are replaced by proof-terms that stand for ‘real’ proofs. These
proof-terms are build up from axiom-constants, proof-variables and function
symbols that represent effective operations on proofs. For example there is a
binary function symbol · that constructs from a proof x of A → B and a proof
y of A a proof x·y of B. Which gives a means to express the rule of modus
ponens, just as (1) but now in an explicit way:
x:(A → B) → (y:A → (x·y):B) .
There are direct translations between modal formulas and LP-formulas. In
one direction we can ‘forget’ the proof-terms in an LP formula by substituting
’s for them (forgetful-projection) and in the other direction we can substitute
proof-terms for the ’s in a modal formula (realizations). The link of LP with
S4 is as follows. For any theorem F of LP, the forgetful projection of F is a
theorem of S4 and for any theorem A of S4 there exists a realization of A that is
a theorem of LP. The latter is nicely formulated as LP can realize all theorems
of S4. This, together with the arithmetical completeness theorem for LP does
give a provability reading to S4 for which S4 is complete.
In [Yav02] and [Nog06] (cf. also [AN04]) the two above mentioned approaches
to model provability propositionally are combined in a single logic that contains
both the  for formal provability and proof-terms for explicit proofs. The logic
LPP form [Yav02] contains a richer language of proof-terms than LP. In [Nog06]
this is shown to be not necessary, there an arithmetically complete logic GLA 1
has been recovered that has exactly the same term language as LP.
Recently F. Montagna posed the question whether GLA allows for the real-
ization of more modal formulas than just S4 (given what we know about LP it
is immediate that GLA realizes at least S4). A negative answer to this ques-
tion, although true as we will see below, is not immediate. For even though the
proof-term language of GLA is the same as it is in LP and both logics are arith-
metical complete, the presence in GLA of proof-terms for statements involving
provability assertions that cannot be made explicit allows so to say for ’s to
occur implicitly in a  free formula. For example for any formula B there exists
a proof term t such that
t:((B → B) → B)
is a theorem of GLA. Such a t then may occur in a  free theorem of GLA.
The main contribution of this paper is the theorem that GLA does not realize
more modal formulas than LP. But we do a little more. Since formulas of GLA
can contain both proof-terms and ’s, we can equally ask for a given modal
formula, in case not all the ’s can be realized, whether then at least some of
them can. During the process of answering the first question we will define a
1GLA was first introduced (under the name LPGL) supplied with Kripke-style semantics
and proved to be arithmetically complete in Nogina’s part of the technical report [AN04].
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(decidable) logic that exactly characterizes the ’s in a modal formula that can
be realized in GLA.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the Logic of Proofs
LP. In Section 3 we define the Logic of Proofs and Formal Provability GLA and
formulate the main research question addressed in this paper. In Section 4 and
Section 5 we give answers to these questions. In the final sections of this paper
we consider some related issues and give some directions for further research.
The author would like to thank Professor Sergei Artemov for useful com-
ments and suggestions.
2 Logic of Proofs
See [AB04] for an extensive overview of LP. Here we only state the basic defi-
nitions and theorems relevant to this paper. The language of LP is two-sorted.
We have proofs terms that are build up using
• Countably many proofs variables x, y, z, . . . and countably many axiom
constants a, b, c, . . .
and two binary function symbols +, · and a unary one !:
• if t and s are proof terms then so are t+s, t·s and !t.
And we have LP formulas, which are generated by the following clauses.
• ‘Propositional Logic’,
• If F is a formula and t a proof term then t:F is a formula.
We say that an LP formula F is normal when all negative occurrences off sub-
formulas t:G of F are of the form x:G, where x is a proof variable.
The logic LP is axiomatized by the following schemata and rules.
A0 ‘Classical Propositional Logic’ (with Modus Ponens),
A1 t:A → A,
A2 s:(A → B) → t:A → (s·t):B,
A3 s:A → (s + t):A, s:A → (t + s):A,
A4 t:A →!t:(t:A),
A5 c:A, c an axiom constant and A an instance of A0-A4.
If F is an LP formula then its forgetful projection F ◦ is obtained by replacing
all the proof terms by ’s. More formally:
• p◦ ≡ p and ⊥◦ ≡ ⊥,
• (A → B)◦ ≡ (A◦ → B◦),
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• (t:A)◦ ≡ (A◦).
A realization of a modal formula F is an LP formula G for which G◦ ≡ F .
One of the fundamental theorems concerning LP is the following.
Theorem 2.1 (Artemov[Art95]). S4  G iff there exists a normal F such that
LP  F and F ◦ ≡ G
Anther fundamental theorem concerning LP is its arithmetical completeness
theorem [Art95]. See also [Art01, Gor05]. In the spirit of the arithmetical
reading of modal formulas F as ‘F is provable’ ([Sol76, Boo93]), formulas of
the form t:F are read as ‘t is a proof of F ’. By Theorem 2.1 this provides us with
a natural provability semantics for modal logic for which S4 is complete. Given
this interpretation of LP it is natural to consider a system that includes both
expressions of the form F and t:F . This has been done in detail in [Yav02,
Nog06]. However the natural lifting of Theorem 2.1 has not been addressed yet
and is the core of this paper.
3 The system GLA
In this section we present the logic GLA from [Nog06] and formulate two ques-
tions that will be answered in the remainder of the paper.
A joint logic of formal provability and explicit proofs has first been studied
in [Yav02]. The logic there however has a richer language of explicit proofs
than LP. In [Nog06] (cf. also [AN04]) a logic GLA, also a joint logic of formal
provability and explicit proofs has been recovered in which the language of
explicit proofs is exactly that of LP. This is the system we will study here.
The language of GLA is that of LP enriched with the modal operator . The
formulas of the system GLA are generated by the following rules.
• ‘Propositional Logic’,
• if A is a formula and t is a proof term then t:A is a formula,
• if A is a formula then A is a formula.
The logic GLA is axiomatized by the following axiom schemata and rules.
• ‘Classical Propositional Logic’ (with Modus Ponens).
• Provability Logic GL:
L1 (A → B) → (A → B),
L2 A → A,
L3 (A → A) → A,
–  A implies  A.
• Logic of Proofs LP:
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A1 t:A → A,
A2 s:(A → B) → t:A → (s·t):B,
A3 s:A → (s + t):A, s:A → (t + s):A,
A4 t:A →!t:(t:A),
A5 c:A, c an axiom constant and A an instance of A0-A4, L1-L3 or
C1-C3.
• Connecting principles:
C1 t:A → A,
C2 ¬t:A → ¬t:A,
C3 t:A → A.
Notice that A5 is ‘richer’ than its analog in LP. The forgetful projection of
an LP formula obviously generalizes to GLA formulas by setting (A)◦ ≡ A◦.
The following two questions about GLA will be addressed.
1. For which modal formulas A can we find LP formulas B with B◦ ≡ A and
GLA  B.
2. For which modal formulas A can we find GLA formulas B with B◦ ≡ A
and GLA  B.
As we will argue in the next subsection, the obvious generalization of the for-
getful projection to GLA formulas as given above does not give us much to work
with in solving these questions. But before we continue with that we finish this
section with a few lemmata from [Nog06] that will be of interest later.
In what follows we write
GLA : X1, . . . , Xn  Y1, . . . , Yk
for the assertion that Y1 ∨ · · · ∨ Yk is provable using modus ponens only from
the theorems of GLA and X1, . . . , Xn.
Lemma 3.1. For any formula A there exists a term t such that
GLA  x:A → t:A
Proof. We have GLA  c:(x:A → A) and GLA  x:A →!x:(x:A). Thus GLA 
x:A → (c·!x):A
Lemma 3.2 (Constructive necessitation). If GLA  A then for some ground
term t we have GLA  t:A
Proof. Induction on a GLA derivation of A. If A is one of the axioms other
than A5 we can take any axiom constant for t. If A is an instance of A5, say
A ≡ a:B, then we can take !a for t. Suppose A is obtained by modus ponens
from B → A and B. Thus GLA  B → A and GLA  B. By (IH) we have
5
terms t1 and t2 such that GLA  t1:(B → A) and GLA  t2:B. And thus for t
we can take t1·t2. Suppose that A is obtained from B using necessitation. Thus
GLA  B. By (IH) we have GLA  t:B for some t. By Lemma 3.1 we that have
for some s that GLA  s:B.
Lemma 3.3 (Lifting lemma). If
GLA : x1:X1, . . . , xn:Xn  Y
then for some term t we have
GLA : x1:X1, . . . , xn:Xn  t:Y .
Moreover the proof-variables in t are all among {x1, . . . , xn}.
Proof. Induction on a derivation of Y from the xi:Xi’s. If Y is one of the Xi’s,
say Xi0 then for t we can take xi0 . If Y is a theorem of GLA the required t is
given by Lemma 3.2. The inductive case when Y is obtained by modes ponens
from previously obtained formulas is similar as in Lemma 3.2.
3.1 The Trouble with the Forgetful Projection in GLA
Obviously, since LP is a sub-system of GLA we have that LP  A implies GLA 
A. And thus in particular by Theorem 2.1 we have the following. (Recall that an
LP formula is normal when all negative occurrences of proof-terms are variables,
we use the same terminology for the more general formulas of GLA.)
Theorem 3.4. If S4  A then for some normal B with B◦ ≡ A we have
GLA  B
It is also true that GLA does not realize all the theorems of GL. For suppose
that for some terms t and r we have
GLA  x:(r:⊥ → ⊥) → t:⊥ .
Since GLA  c:(r:⊥ → ⊥ we thus have GLA  t[x/c]:⊥ and by reflection GLA 
⊥. A contradiction.
As we will see below the theorems of GL that can be realized in GLA are
precisely those formulas that are also theorems of S4. Clearly to show this it
suffices to show the the other direction of Theorem 3.4, this however is less
straightforward then in the S4/LP case. One easily sees that if LP  A then
S4  A◦. If we however in the most straightforward way extend the definition of
forgetful projection to formulas in the language of GLA, then the set of theorems
of GLA under this projection is not even closed under modus ponens. For the
following three formulas are theorem of GLA.
• (p → p) → p,
• x:p → p,
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• (x:p → p).
Their forgetful projections are respectively
• (p → p) → p,
• p → p,
• (p → p).
From which p follows using modus ponens. Obviously p is not a projection of
any theorem of GLA. The trick is to not study the ‘plain’ forgetful projection but
a variant that remembers which ’s came from proof terms and which where
already there. This is what we will carry out in the coming sections.
4 The system EI
In this section we will show that only the theorems of S4 can be realized in
GLA. The main tool is a modal propositional logic with two modalities  and
. In particular we will be interested in the modal formulas in this language
that constitute image of the following generalization of forgetful projection to
GLA formulas.
Definition 4.1 (Forgetful projection). For an GLA formula A we define the
forgetful projection A◦ with induction on A as follows.
• p◦ ≡ p and ⊥◦ ≡ ⊥,
• (A → B)◦ ≡ (A◦ → B◦),
• (A)◦ ≡ (A◦),
• (t:A)◦ ≡ (A◦).
Let EI (for Explicit/Implicit) be the normal bi-modal logic axiomatized by
the following axiom schemata and rules.
CP ‘Classical Propositional Logic’ (with Modus Ponens),
L1 (A → B) → (A → B),
L2 A → A,
L3 (A → A) → A,
S1 (A → B) → (A → B),
S2 A →   A,
S3 A → A,
C1 A → A,
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C2 ¬  A → ¬  A,
C3 A → A,
R  A implies  A.
Lemma 4.2. GLA  A implies EI  A◦
Proof. Induction on a GLA derivation of A. If A is an instance of A5 then A
is of the form c:B, B◦ is an axiom of EI and B◦(≡ (c:B)◦) is derivable using
 necessitation. If A is an instance of any of the other axiom schemata then
A◦ is an axiom of EI. Suppose A ≡ B, and the last step in the derivation of
A is necessitation. By (IH) we obtain EI  B◦. By  necessitation we obtain
EI  B◦ and by C1 and modus ponens we get EI  B◦. The case ‘the last
step is modus ponens’ is trivial.
Definition 4.3 (EI-frame). A bi-modal Kripke frame 〈W, R, R〉 is an EI-
frame if
1. R is transitive and conversely well-founded,
2. R is transitive and reflexive,
3. xRy implies xRy,
4. xRy and xRz implies yRz,
5. for all x there exists y such that xRy and yRx.
Notice that no finite frames satisfying both 1 and 5 exist. For if 5 holds that
one inductively constructs a sequence
x1R
x2Rx3 · · ·
For which we in addition have · · ·x3Rx2Rx1. Thus by transitivity of R we
have for all i < j
xjR
xi .
But if the frame is finite then for some i < j we must have xi = xj , contradicting
the conversely well-foundedness of R.
Nevertheless, as we will see later, EI is decidable and can be embedded in a
sub-logic that does have finite models and is complete for a class of finite frames.
Lemma 4.4 (Modal soundness). If EI  A then A is valid on any EI-frame
Proof. As usual it suffices to show the lemma for A an axiom of EI. All instances
of GL and S4 are well-known to hold because of properties 1 and 2 of EI-frames.
We show that A → A is valid. Suppose w  A and suppose wRx. By
3 we have wRx and thus x  A.
To show that also A → A is valid, suppose that in addition xRy then
by 2 wRy and thus y  A as well.
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Now we show that ¬  A → ¬  A is valid. Suppose w  ¬  A and
wRx. For some y with wRy we have y  ¬A. By 4 we have xRy and thus
x  ¬  A.
Finally we show that A → A is valid. Suppose w  A. By 5 there
exists some x with wRx and xRw. We thus have x  A and thus w 
A.
We aim at showing that the -free fragment of EI coincides with S4. One
direction, namely that S4 is a subset of the -free fragment is obvious. For the
other direction we will make use of the completeness of S4 with respect to tran-
sitive and reflexive Kripke frames [BdRV01]. We will use bounded morphisms
to connect these frames with our EI-frames.
Definition 4.5 (Bounded morphism). Let M and M ′ be two Kripke models.
A bounded morphism from M to M ′ is a surjective mapping M −→ M ′ such
that for all x, y ∈ M we have
• x  p iff f(x) ′ p,
• xRy implies f(x)R′f(y),
• If f(x)R′y′ then for some y we have f(y) = y′ and xRy.
The following lemma is well-known, see [BdRV01].
Lemma 4.6. If f is a bounded morphism from M to M ′ then for all w ∈ M ,
M, w is bisimilar with M ′, f(w). Consequently for any formula A, M |= A iff
M ′ |= A.
Proposition 4.7. For any transitive and reflexive Kripke model M there exists
an EI model Mω = 〈Wω , R, R, 〉 such that there exists a bounded morphism
from 〈Wω , R, 〉 to M
Proof. Let M = 〈W, R, 〉 be an S4 model. Let W1, W2, . . . be ω disjoint
copies of W . For x ∈ W we denote with xi the copy of x in Wi. Define




• xiRyj iff xRy,
• xiRyj iff x = y and j < i,
• xi  p iff x  p.
First we will show that Mω is based on an EI-frame. That R is transitive
and reflexive is immediate. That R is transitive and conversely well-founded
is also easy to see. Suppose that xiRyj. Then we thus have in particular
that x = y and by reflexivity of R we get xiRyj . Suppose that xiRyj and
xiR
zk. We have to show that yRz. But this follows immediately since from
our assumptions it follows that y = x and xRz. Let xi ∈ Wω. We have to show
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that for some yj ∈ Wω we have xiRyj and yjRxi. Just take yj = xi+1. This
completes the proof that Mω is based on an EI-frame.
We show that the mapping f defined by f(xi) = x is a bounded morphism
from 〈Wω , R, 〉 to M . f is clearly surjective and by definition of  we have
xi  p iff f(xi)  p. Suppose xiRyj . Then xRy and thus f(xi)Rf(yj).
Suppose f(xi)Ry. f(xi) = x, thus xRy. By definition of R we have xiRyi.
And by definition of f we have f(yi) = y.
Theorem 4.8. If A is -free and EI  A then S4  A
Proof. We show that any A satisfying the assumptions of the theorem is valid
on all transitive and reflexive frames. The theorem then follows from the modal
completeness of S4 ([BdRV01]). So let F be some S4 frame and let M be a
model based on F . Let Mω be the EI-model from Proposition 4.7. By Lemma
4.4 of EI we have that Mω |= A. And since M is a bounded morphic image from
Mω we also have by Lemma 4.6 that M |= A.
Theorem 4.9. Any modal formula that is realizable in GLA is a theorem of S4
Proof. Let B be a realization of A (that is B◦ ≡ A) such that GLA  B. By
Lemma 4.2 EI  B◦ and thus by Theorem 4.8 S4  B◦.
4.1 Modal Completeness
In this section we will show the modal completeness of EI with respect to EI
frames. This can be done directly but we will take a little detour via a sub-logic
EI− of EI. This will be useful later on when we characterize what ’s of a given
modal formula are realizable in GLA.
Let EI− be the system obtained from EI by dropping the axiom scheme C3.
For a set X of formulas let B(X) be the set of boolean combinations of formulas




{(B → B) | B ∈ B(Sub(A))} .
Theorem 4.10. The following are equivalent.
1. EI−  wr(A) → A
2. EI  A
3. A is valid in all EI-frames
The implications 1 ⇒ 2 is clear since EI is an extension of EI− and EI  wr(A).
The implication 2 ⇒ 3 was shown in Lemma 4.4 above. We will show that 3 ⇒ 1.
Assume that EI− 
 wr(A) → A. Let Φ be a finite set of formulas that is sub-
formula closed, contains A and is closed under single negation. We say that a
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set Γ ⊆ Φ is maximal wr(A)-consistent when Γ + {wr(A)} is consistent in EI−
and no set Γ′ ⊆ Φ, properly extending Γ is. Put
W ′ = {Γ | Γ is a maximal wr(A)-consistent subset of Φ} .
As in the proof of Proposition 4.7 we let W0, W1, . . . be countably many disjoint






• A ∈ Γiimplies  A, A ∈ ∆j .
And ΓiR∆j iff
• A ∈ Γi iff A ∈ ∆j ,
• A ∈ Γi implies A, A ∈ ∆j ,
• j < i or, i = j and there exist C ∈ ∆j with C 
∈ Γi.
Lemma 4.11. 〈W, R, R〉 is an EI frame
Proof. Obviously R is transitive and reflexive.
Transitivity of R: Suppose ΓiR∆jRΘk. The first two properties that
should hold between Γi and Θk for us to conclude ΓiRΘk are easily verified.
We now verify the third one. In case k < j then also k < i. In case k = j we
have some C ∈ Θk such that C 
∈ ∆j . But then also C 
∈ Γi.




Γi2 · · ·
Since for m > n we have in ≥ im there exists some k ≥ 0 such that for all l ≥ k,
il = ik. But then for all n > m ≥ k, Γin contains strictly more -formulas than
Γim . Since Φ is finite and each Γi ⊆ Φ this leads to a contradiction.
So properties 1 and 2 of Definition 4.3 hold. Properties 3 and 4 are easily
checked. We now show property 5.
Fix Γi. We have to find some ∆j with ΓiR∆jRΓi. Let
∆′ = {B,¬  C | B,¬  C ∈ Γi} + {♦D ∈ Φ | ♦D ∈ Γi or D ∈ Γi} .







We have  ¬D → (¬D ∧ ¬D) and  C →   C and thus
∧
B, wr(A)  
(∨







B, wr(A)  
(∨







(¬D ∧ ¬D) ∨ ∨ C is a boolean combination of formulas in Φ, and
thus a boolean combination of sub-formulas of A we have
wr(A)  
(∨






(¬D ∧ ¬D) ∨
∨
C .
And thus by the fact that Γ  ∧ B and Γ  ∧¬  C we obtain
Γ, wr(A) 
∨
(¬D ∧ ¬D) .
But for each of those D’s, Γ  ♦D ∨ D. Contradicting the wr(A)-consistency
of Γ. Now let j = i + 1 and ∆j be some maximal wr(A)-consistent subset of Φ
extending ∆′. It checks out easily that ΓR∆jRΓi.
To turn 〈W, R, R〉 into a model put Γ  p iff p ∈ Γ.
Lemma 4.12 (Truth lemma). For all A ∈ Φ and all Γ we have that Γ  A ⇔
A ∈ Γ
Proof. Induction on A. If A is a propositional variable the lemma holds by
definition of . The cases for the boolean connectives are trivial.
Case A ≡ B. (⇐) Suppose B ∈ Γ and ΓR∆ then B ∈ ∆ and by (IH)
we get ∆  B. (⇒) Suppose B 
∈ Γ. We will show that
∆′ = {C,¬  D | C,¬  D ∈ Γ} + {E, E | E ∈ Γ} + {¬B, B}












E, wr(A)  (B → B) .






E, wr(A)  B .
But the left hand side of  is all provable from Γ + wr(A) and thus so is B,
a contradiction. Now for any ∆ with ∆′ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ Φ we have ΓR∆ and by (IH)
we have ∆  ¬B.
Suppose A ≡ B. (⇐) Suppose B ∈ Γ and ΓR∆. Then B ∈ ∆ and by
(IH) ∆  B. (⇒) Suppose B 
∈ Γ. Let ∆′ = {C, C | C ∈ Γ} + {¬B}.
∆′ is easy seen to be wr(A)-consistent. Any ∆ with ∆′ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ Φ satisfies
ΓR∆  ¬B.
Since ¬A is contained in some Γ ∈ W we thus have an EI model M , w ∈ M
and w  ¬A.
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5 The System GEI−
In this section we will define a cut-free Gentzen system GEI− for EI−. The
existence of such a system is the reason for considering EI−, since for EI such
a system does not seem to exist. In Section 5.1 below we will use this system
to realize theorems of both EI− and EI in GLA. GEI− is defined by the following
axioms and rules. Axioms:
Ax




Γ′, Γ  ∆, ∆′
Contraction:
A, A, Γ  ∆
LC
A, Γ  ∆
Γ  ∆, A, A
RC
Γ  ∆, A
Propositional:
Γ  A, ∆ Γ, B  ∆
L →
Γ, A → B  ∆
Γ, A  B, ∆
R →
Γ  A → B, ∆
GL:
∆0,¬  ∆1, Γ, Γ, A  A
R∆0,¬  ∆1, Γ  A
S4:
Γ, A  ∆
L
Γ, A  ∆
Γ  A
RΓ  A
We will write GEI− : Γ  ∆ for ‘the sequent Γ  ∆ is derivable in GEI−’ and
GEI− : Γ 
 ∆ for the negation of that assertion.
We define an EI−-frame similarly as an EI-frame (Definition 4.3) but without
condition 5. In what follows we establish the equivalence of the following.
1. GEI− : Γ  ∆,
2. EI−  ∧ Γ → ∨ ∆,
3.
∧
Γ → ∨ ∆ is valid on all finite EI−-frames.
The implications 1 ⇒ 2 is an easy induction and 2 ⇒ 3 is clear given our
experience with EI (see the proof of Lemma 4.4). We show 3 ⇒ 1. Assume
Γ 
 ∆. Let Φ be the set of sub-formulas of formulas in Γ ∪ ∆ and their single
negations. We say that a pair 〈Γ, ∆〉 is maximally consistent in Φ when Γ∪∆ ⊆
Φ, Γ 
 ∆ and for all A ∈ Φ − Γ we have Γ, A  ∆. And for all A ∈ Φ − ∆ we
have Γ  ∆, A. Let
W = {〈Γ, ∆〉 | 〈Γ, ∆〉 maximally consistent in Φ} .
If w ∈ W then we write w = 〈Γw, ∆w〉. Define xRy iff
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• A ∈ Γx iff A, A ∈ Γy.
And xRy iff
• A ∈ Γx implies A, A ∈ Γy,
• B ∈ Γx iff B ∈ Γy,
• for some C ∈ Γy we have C 
∈ Γx.
Lemma 5.1. 〈W, R, R〉 is an EI−-frame
Proof. Clearly both R and R are transitive. Also clearly, since Φ is finite,
R is conversely well-founded.
We show that R is reflexive. Suppose that for some w ∈ W we have
B ∈ Γw. If B 
∈ Γ then B, Γw  ∆w and thus also B, Γw 
∈ ∆w. But then
since B ∈ Γw we thus have Γw  ∆w. A contradiction.
We show that wRx and wRy implies xRy. Let B ∈ Γx. Then B ∈
Γw and thus B, B ∈ Γy.
We show xRy implies xRy. Let B ∈ Γx. Then B ∈ Γy.
Now to turn 〈W, R, R〉 into a model define
w  p ⇔ p ∈ Γw .
Lemma 5.2 (Truth lemma). For all A ∈ Φ we have that for all w ∈ W
1. A ∈ Γw implies w  A and
2. A ∈ ∆w implies w 
 A.
Proof. We show both items simultaneously with induction on in A.
Case A ≡ p. Item 1 is clear by definition. Suppose A ∈ ∆w. Since Γw 
 ∆w,
A 
∈ Γw and thus w 
 A.
Case A ≡ B → C. Suppose B → C ∈ Γw. Then B ∈ ∆w or C ∈ Γw.
In the first case (IH) give w 
 B and in the second case w  C. Suppose
B → C ∈ ∆w. Then B ∈ Γw and C ∈ ∆w. For if not then Γw, B  ∆w or
Γw  C, ∆w . Therefor in either case by weakening we get Γw, B  C, ∆w . Thus
Γw  B → C, ∆w and by contraction Γw  ∆w. So by (IH) we get w  B and
w 
 C.
Case A ≡ B. Item 1 is immediate. Suppose B ∈ ∆w. We show that
{C, C | C ∈ Γw}, {D | D ∈ Γw}, {¬  E | ¬ ∈ Γw}, B 
 B .
For if not then
{C | C ∈ Γw}, {D | D ∈ Γw}, {¬  E | ¬ ∈ Γw}  B .
And thus Γw  ∆w as well. A contradiction. Clearly now we can find some x
with wRx and B ∈ ∆x. By (IH) we see x 
 B.
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Case A ≡ B. Item 1 is immediate. Suppose B ∈ ∆w. We show that
{B, B | B ∈ Γw} 
 B .
For if not then
{B, B | B ∈ Γw}  B
and thus also
{B, B | B ∈ Γw}  B .
By a couple of contractions we obtain
{B | B ∈ Γw}  B
and thus by weakening Γw  ∆w, a contradiction.
Corollary 5.3. Both EI− and EI are decidable
Proof. Decidability of EI− follows from the above cut-free Gentzen formulation.
Decidability of EI follows then from Theorem 4.10.
As a corollary to the above corollary we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4. Given a modal formula A, determining what ’s in A can be
realized by proof terms such that the result is a theorem of GLA is decidable. In
particular it is decidable what ’s in a theorem of GL can be seen as explicit
proofs.
Proof. Consider the set of formulas X obtainable from A by replacing some ’s
by ’s. The formulas from X that are theorems of EI are exactly the answers
to the problem and are effectively computable by Corollary 5.3.
5.1 Realizing EI− in GLA
In this section we will show the following.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose EI−  A. Then for some normal B with B◦ ≡ A we
have GLA  B
In the proof of this theorem below we will constantly substitute proof-terms
for proof-variables. So with a substitution we will always mean a mapping from
proof-variables to proof-terms. If α and β are substitutions then with α ◦ β
we denote the substitution σ defined by σ(x) = α(β(x)). If Γ is a multi-set of
formulas then we write Γ[σ] for the result of applying σ to all the formulas in
Γ.
Lemma 5.6. If GLA : Γ  ∆ and σ is a substitution then
GLA : Γ[σ]  ∆[σ].
Proof. Clear.
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Proof of Theorem 5.5. Consider a GEI− derivation of A. We picture this deriva-
tion as a tree where all the nodes are labeled with sequents, the root node is
labeled with the conclusion of the derivation and the leafs with axioms. We will
realize all the sequents in this derivation in two steps. In step one we replace
each GEI− sequent in the derivation tree with a GLA sequent. These sequents
are not derivable in GLA yet. In step two we will construct for each of those
GLA sequents Γ  ∆ a substitution σ such that
GLA : Γ[σ]  ∆[σ] .
(Step 1) All the occurrences of  in this derivation naturally split up into
disjoint families as follows. We say that an occurrence of a  in a side formula
in the conclusion of a rule-application is a direct descendant of another if the
latter is a corresponding occurrence in (one of the) the premise(ses). So for
example let X() be a formula where we have ‘indicated’ an occurrence of 
and consider an application of the L→ rule.
Γ  A, ∆, X() Γ, B  ∆, X()
Γ, A → B  ∆, X()
Then the two indicated occurrences of  in the premise are direct descendants
of the one in the conclusion. As another example consider and application of
the R rule.
∆0,¬  ∆1, Γ, X(), Γ, X(), A  A
∆0,¬  ∆1, Γ, X()  A
Again, the indicated occurrences of  in the premise are direct descendants
of the one in the conclusion. These are the only two examples in which an
occurrence of  in a side formula has two direct descendants.
Similarly we define direct descendants of occurrences of ’s in principal
formulas in a rule application. For example consider an application of the RW
rule.
Γ  ∆, A(), A()
Γ  ∆, A()
The two indicated occurrences of  in the premise are direct descendants of the
one in the conclusion This and the analog for the LC rule are the only examples
in which an occurrence of  in a principal formula has two direct descendants.
Now we say that two occurrences are directly related if one of them is a
direct descendant of the other and the relation related is the transitive closure
direct related. Since the system GEI− respects polarities, the collection of ’s
in a derivation split up into disjoint families of related ’s of equal polarity.
Lets say there are k families and number them from 1 to k. In every GEI−
sequent Γ  ∆ do the following to obtain a GLA sequent. Replace each negative
 that belongs to family i with a fresh proof variable xi. For a positive  that
belongs to family j, let n be the number of  introduced by a R rule and
replace this  with uj1 + · · · + ujk. All the variables x1, . . . , u11, . . . , uji , . . . are
taken to be pairwise distinct. This completes step 1.
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(Step 2) We define with induction the depth of a sequent Γ  ∆ (the depth
of a sequent is the maximal distance to an axiom) a substitution σ such that
GLA : Γ[σ]  ∆[σ] .
Additionally we will assure that if the r’th R rule in family s does not occur




In the base case of the induction we can simply take σ = id. For all the rules but
the L→, R, L and the R we clearly can simply take the same substitution
for the conclusion as for the premise. In what follows we write out the remaining
rules.
We first do the L→ rule. So suppose
GLA : Γ[α]  A[α], ∆[α] and GLA : Γ[β], B[β]  ∆[β] .
By (2) we have
α ◦ β = β ◦ α .
Thus if we define σ as α ◦ β then by Lemma 5.6 we have that
GLA : Γ[σ]  A[σ], ∆[σ] and GLA : Γ[σ], B[σ]  ∆[σ] .
Thus
GLA : Γ[σ], (A → B)[σ]  ∆[σ] .
Now we consider the R case. Thus suppose we have
GLA : x:∆0[σ],¬t:∆1[σ], Γ[σ], Γ[σ]  (A → A)[σ] .
Doing the very same proof under the  gives us
GLA : x:∆0[σ], ¬t:∆1[σ], Γ[σ], Γ[σ]  (A → A)[σ] .
Thus
GLA : x:∆0,¬t:∆1, Γ, (A → A) .
And thus
GLA : x:∆0,¬t:∆1, Γ, A .
So we simply take the same substitution σ for the conclusion of these rules as
for the premise.
Now let us consider the R rule. Let this be the r’th rule in family s. By
(IH) we have
GLA : x:Γ[σ]  A[σ] .
By lifting we find some t not containing any of the u’s such that
GLA : x:Γ[σ]  t:A[σ] .
17
Now by (2) we have that σ(usr) = u
s
r, thus if we put σ
′ = σ[usr/t] we have
GLA : x:Γ[σ′]  ((us1 + · · · + t + · · · + usn):A) [σ′] .
And since t does not contain usr we thus conclude
GLA : x:Γ[σ′]  ((us1 + · · · + usr + · · · + usk):A) [σ′] .
Finally we consider the case L. So we have
GLA : Γ[σ], A[σ]  ∆[σ] .
Let the L rule introduce a  from the family with number i. Then clearly also
GLA : Γ[σ], xi:A[σ]  ∆[σ] .
Corollary 5.7. Suppose EI  A. Then for some normal B with B◦ ≡ A we
have GLA  B
Proof. Suppose EI  A. By Theorem 4.10 we have EI−  wr(A) → A. By
Theorem 5.5 we find a normal B with B◦ ≡ wr(A) → A and GLA  B. Now B
is of the form C → D where D◦ ≡ A and C◦ is a conjunction of formulas of the
form (X → X). By normality of C → D, C is a conjunction of formulas
of the form x:(t:X → X). Let x1, . . . , xk be all the proof variables that occur
in C. Let a be an axiom constant. Then GLA  D[x1/a, . . . , xk/a], by using the
axiom necessitation scheme (x:(t:X → X)) [x1/a, . . . , xk/a].
6 The Disjunction Property for GLA
In this section we will prove the disjunction property for GLA. The analog for
LP was first established in [Kru03] using a minimal model construction for LP
and we will use the same technique here.
With a constant specification we mean a set CS of pairs 〈c, A〉 where c:A is
an instance of A5. With GLA(CS) we denote the fragment of GLA where A5 is
restricted to c:A for 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS. For the sake of completeness we repeat some
definitions from [AN04].
Definition 6.1 (GLA-model). A GLA-model is a structure 〈W, R, 〉 where
1. R is a transitive conversely well-founded relation on W ,
2.  is a forcing relation satisfying for all w, v ∈ W ,
(a) the usual constraint on boolean connectives and ,
(b) for all t:F , w  t:F iff v  t:F ,
(c) w  t:F implies w  F ,
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(d) w  s:(F → G) and w  t:F implies w  (s·t):G,
(e) w  t:F implies w  (t + s):F and w  (s + t):F ,
(f) w  t:F implies w !t:(t:F ).
Let F be a formula. Put
S(F ) =
∧
{A → A | A ∈ Sub(F )} .
We say that a rooted GLA-model 〈W, R, 〉 with root r is F -sound when
r  S(F ) .
A rooted GLA-model is a CS-model when it is A-sound for all 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS and
c:A holds in the whole model. The following theorem is shown in [AN04].
Theorem 6.2 (Modal completeness). GLA(CS)  A iff A is valid in all A-sound
CS-models
For the remainder of this section we fix a finite constant specification CS. Let
∗ be the least map
∗ : GLA-terms −→ P(GLA-formulas)
for which
• ∗(c) = {A | 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS},
• F → G ∗ (s) and F ∈ ∗(t) implies G ∈ ∗(s·t),
• F ∈ ∗(s) implies F ∈ ∗(s + t) and F ∈ ∗(t + s),
• F ∈ ∗(t) implies t:F ∈ ∗(!t).
The following lemma follows immediately from minimality of ∗.
Lemma 6.3. 1. For all variables x, ∗(x) = ∅,
2. for all constants c, ∗(c) = {A | 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS},
3. F ∈ ∗(t + s) implies F ∈ ∗(t) or F ∈ ∗(s),
4. F ∈ ∗(s·t) implies that for some G, G ∈ ∗(t) and G → F ∈ ∗(s),
5. F ∈ ∗(!t) implies that for some G ∈ ∗(t), F ≡ t:G.
Corollary 6.4. If F ∈ ∗(t) then GLA(CS)  t:F
Proof. Induction on the complexity of t using Lemma 6.3.
Now given this map ∗ we define a GLA-model M = 〈W, R 〉 as follows.
• W = {w0, w1, w2, . . .},
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• wiRwj iff i > j,
• w  p for all w ∈ W and all p,
• w  t:A iff A ∈ ∗(t) and for all v ∈ W , v  A.
Lemma 6.5. M is a GLA-model. Moreover it is a GLA-model in which c:A
holds for all 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS.
Proof. R is clearly transitive and conversely well-founded. All constraints on 
hold by definition and the properties of the map ∗. For 〈c, A〉 ∈ CS we have by
Theorem 6.2 that A holds in M . We also have that A ∈ ∗(c) and thus c:A holds
in M .
The next lemma implies that for any F there exists some w ∈ W such that
w generates an F -sound CS-model.




Proof. If not then for some i < n and r < s ≤ n we have r  Ai ∧ ¬Ai and
s  Ai ∧ ¬Ai. But wsRwr. A contradiction.
Theorem 6.7 (Disjunction property). If GLA(CS)  t:A ∨ s:B then
GLA(CS)  t:A or GLA(CS)  s:B .
Proof. Suppose GLA(CS)  t:A ∨ s:B. Let M be the model defined above. For
any i ≥ 0 let Mi be the sub-model of M generated by wi. Since CS is finite by
Lemma 6.6 there exists an i ≥ 0 such that Mi is an (t:A∨s:B)-sound CS-model.
By Theorem 6.2 we have wi  t:A ∨ s:B. But then wi  t:A or wi  s:B. In
the first case by Corollary 6.4 we get GLA(CS)  t:A and in the second case
GLA(CS)  s:B.
Notice that Theorem 6.7 generalizes to arbitrary constant specifications.
7 The Intersection of S4 and GL
We give an axiomatization of all formulas in the intersection of S4 with GL. We
show that this normal modal logic has the Craig-interpolation property.
We follow the terminology from [Seg72]. That is, a modal logic is a proper
subset of the set of all modal formulas closed under substitution and modes
ponens. A modal logic is normal when it is also closed under necessitation and
contains all instances of (A → B) → (A → B). The following lemmata
are folklore.
Lemma 7.1. S4 is the smallest modal logic that contains all the theorems of
K4 and all instances of A → A and (A → A).
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Lemma 7.2. GL is the smallest modal logic that contains all the theorems of
K4 and all instances of (A → A) → A and ((A → A) → A).
In what follows we abbreviate
L(p) ≡ (p → p) → p ,
R(p) ≡ p → p .
Lemma 7.3. S4  ¬L(⊥) and GL  L(⊥)
Proof. We have S4  ♦ and S4  ♦ and thus S4  ¬L(⊥). GL  L(⊥) is
clear.
Let GR be the smallest normal modal logic that contains all the instances of
4 A → A,
G L(⊥) → L(A),
R ¬L(⊥) → R(A).
We write S4 ∩ GL  A for S4  A and GL  A.
Theorem 7.4. S4 ∩ GL  A iff GR  A
Proof. The right to left direction is immediate from Lemma 7.3. To show the
other direction let A be a theorem of both S4 and GL. Then by Lemma 7.1 we




(Xi → Xi) → A .




((Yi → Yi) → Yi) → A .
As K4 ⊆ GR and
GR  ¬L(⊥) ∨ L(⊥) →
∧
1≤i≤k
(Xi → Xi) ∨
∧
1≤i≤n
((Yi → Yi) → Yi)
we have GR  ¬L(⊥) ∨ L(⊥) → A and thus GR  A.
Theorem 7.5. GR enjoys the Craig-interpolation property
Proof. Suppose GR  A → B. Then both GL  A → B and S4  A → B.
By the interpolation theorems for GL ([Boo93]) and S4 ([BdRV01]) we find I1
and I2, in the common language of A and B such that GL  A → I1 → B and
S4  A → I2 → B. Now put
I ≡ (I1 ∧ L(⊥)) ∨ (I2 ∧ ¬L(⊥)) .
Since GL  L(⊥) we have GL  I ↔ I1 and since S4  ¬L(⊥) we have S4  I ↔
I2. Thus I is an interpolant for A → B in both S4 and GL.
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We have shown in the main body of this paper that the intersection of S4
with GL is of interest when studying combined logics of explicit and formal
proofs. Therefor the standard questions in the studies of modal logic are in
order. However, intersections of modal logics are in general not the nicest objects
in existence [Sch86]. Apparently, by Theorem 7.5 with GL and S4 we might be
more lucky and therefore desirable and well-behaved answers to the questions
below are plausible.
Question 1. Is there a nice cut-free formulation of GR?
Question 2. What is the explicit version of GR?
Question 3. What is the closed fragment of GR?
7.1 Post completeness
Above we have seen one way the intersection of GL with S4 naturally comes up.
Another way this might be the case is as follows. In [Seg72] a modal logic is
called post complete when it has no proper (non-trivial) extensions. It is known
that there are exactly two normal post complete modal logics. Namely Tr: the
smallest normal modal logic containing all instances of A ↔ A. And Ns: the
smallest normal modal logic containing ⊥.
Every normal modal logic is contained in Tr or Ns. Also S4 is not a sub-logic
of Ns, GL not a sub-logic of Tr but, obviously, GR is a sub-logic of both. If L1
and L2 are normal modal sub-logics of S4 and of Ns, then so is the least logic
extending L1 ∪ L2. Thus the following question is well defined.
Question 4. What is the largest normal modal sub-logic of S4 that is contained
in Ns?
Obviously the answer is S4 ∩ Ns
Question 5. Is S4 ∩ Ns = GR?
Since in fact Tr is the only logic (not necessarily normal) extending S4, the
following might be easier.
Question 6. Is GL ∩ Tr = GR?
8 Further Directions
In this final section we discuss some further directions for further research.
8.1 Conservativity
One could still ask whether GLA allows for a more efficient realization of S4 then
LP. A negative answer to this question is clearly implied by a positive answer
to the following one.
Question 7. Is GLA conservative over LP?
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8.2 Further Relations with GL
One of the most striking features of the provability logic GL is the De Jongh-
Sambin fixed-point theorem [Boo93].
Question 8. Does the fixed-point theorem hold for EI?
The answer is almost certainly yes. The axiom A →   A is probably
enough, so the fixed-point theorem would probably even hold in a much weaker
system.
Since the formulas A represent decidable statements, one expects that the
calculated fixed points can be simplified. Assuming that we do have a fixed
point theorem for EI, then for the version of the fixed point theorem for the
fragment of EI with only one propositional variable this is the case: in fixed-
points we can eliminate all occurrences of . This immediately follows from
what we discus next.
We say that a closed formula F is in normal form when it is a truth functional
combination of formulas of the form i⊥. We show that any closed formula is
equivalent to one in normal form. From the proof of the analog for GL one can
obtain the following ([Boo93]).
Lemma 8.1. If F is a closed and  free. Then EI  F or for some i we have
EI  F ↔ i⊥.
Theorem 8.2. Any closed formula is equivalent, in EI, to a formula in normal
form.
Proof. By the normal form theorem for sentences in GL it is enough to show
that any formula F can be written in normal form whenever F is in normal
form. We have
EI  F ↔ F .
By Lemma 8.1 we thus have that either
EI  F ↔ 
or
EI  F ↔ ⊥ .
(As a side remark note that this theorem obviously transfers to GLA.)
Nevertheless the following is still unclear.
Question 9. If we do have a general fixed-point theorem for EI, can we then
eliminate all occurrences of  in the fixed-points?
I would conjecture no but maybe something weaker is true.
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8.3 New Operations on Proofs
An interesting modal formula in the language of EI is the following.
(A ∨ B) → A ∨ B . (3)
Contrary to the two variations
• A → A
• (A ∨ B) → A ∨ B
this formula is not derivable in EI. An EI counter-model is shown in Figure 1.
There the solid edges denote R relations and the dashed ones R relations
and we have omitted the reflexive R relations. One easily checks that
(p ∨ q) → p ∨ q
does not hold in the bottom node.
p, q
¬p, q ¬q, p
q p
q p
Figure 1: Counter Model
Nevertheless in arithmetic a computable operation on proofs for this scheme
is easily defined and thus a logic that somehow contains such an operation would
be a natural thing to study.
A drawback of such a hypothetical logic is that if it does have the internal-
ization property, then it lacks the disjunction property (the disjunction property
for LP was established in [Kru03] and for GLA it is shown in Section 6 above).
For we have  x:p ∨ ¬x:p. Thus by internalization for some closed t we get
 t:(x:A ∨ ¬x:A).
Using a explicit version of (3) we then get for some r,  r:(x:A)∨r:(¬x:A). And
a disjunction property would give  x:p or  ¬x:p. Which is clearly absurd.
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